Blindspot on Rehabilitation or Disengagement Program of Return Pro-ISIS in Indonesia

(picture: Ulta Levenia meets childrens of radicalized parents during her field research in Indonesia. Credits: Ulta Levenia / Galatea 2019)

Ulta Levenia is the lead researcher of Galatea on Terrorism and a consultant for Semar Sentinel Pte Ltd.

Dr. Alban Sciascia is the director of Semar Sentinel Pte Ltd. He is also an author for Galatea.

Indonesian rehabilitation and disengagement program need an urgent improvement in order to cope with the future threats of returnees or “deportees”. Around 775 Indonesian former ISIS sympathisers scattered in several camps in Syria. Most of them are women and children who wish to return to Indonesia. However, none of the reliable programs have been proved to be effective. In Indonesia, most people who return from Syria - either they are returnees by their own or deported from countries such Turkey, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore or Sri Lanka - will be spotted by authorities and then arrested. They will follow the same process.

First, they will be interrogated by Densus 88, in order to get a clear picture of their implication within local terrorist organisations such as JAD, JAT, JAS or JI. Second, if they are considered to be a threat to national security, because of their links with above mentioned groups, they will be put under investigation, while, according to the evidences gathered, some charges might be press against them.

However, if they did not belong to those groups and considered as innocent - mostly the case for women who tend to follow their husband- they will be hosted by rehabilitation centres, organised by Ministry of Social Affairs. They will then need to pass a rehabilitation process, which is managed by BNPT or in consort with selected NGOs.

During our research and engagement with rehabilitation centres and Indonesian authorities, it has been made clear that the rehabilitation program did not separate or makes any difference between the ones who are returnees from the one who are deportees. At the moment, there is no field dynamic in Indonesia which support this distinction. Regardless of how the analyst called them, the only efficient indicator at the moment to separate them is the pivotal examination of their relationship with a local terrorist group in Indonesia, which could lead to terrorism acts during their return to society.

The arguments made by the Singapore-based analyst Anindya in an article published in the Jakarta Post are unwarranted. Indeed, field research is demonstrating the contrary. First, there is no difference made between returnees and deportees for law enforcement and government officials when they deal with returnees and deportees. Second, arguments she defends tend to show a lack of reluctance to criticise the program set up by Indonesian government and NGOs.

One of the main critics we can formulate is the statement that only social workers have been versed enough with their skills to mingle with the deportees. During our field research, Ulta managed to exchange with people hosted in rehabilitation within a day. One of the issues that she had noticed then was that social workers did not have the tools and knowledge to assess the radicalisation of these returnees and deportees. And these tools and knowledge are not easy to get. As an example, during their discussion with the Detachment 88 personnel, most of the deportees or returnees mostly show a good behaviour, but it does not mean that they agree to sign the integration agreement or even accept the NKRI values.

Anindya gives an example of Dhania, who currently works in an NGO in Indonesia. She argues that some returnees are less radical than some of the deportees. However, she did not realise Dhania and two of her sisters cannot represent hundreds of returnees that have been disseminated in the society.

Using this small sample provides positive results for the Singapore-based researcher, but it is still far from the reality of the field. During our research, Ulta have met several of these returnees, for instance AH and JM. Both of them returned to Indonesia and attempt to train their community with what they have been taught in Syria. It consisted mainly in ideology indoctrination and terror strategies. Fortunately, Detachment 88 managed to arrest these two returnees before they intend to conduct terrorist action. Cooperation between Detachment 88 and Ministry of Social Affairs is covered under a MoU. However, it is imperative for the government to enhance this cooperation under a legal framework in order to improve the rehabilitation program.

Especially for those incoming 775 former ISIS sympathisers, which will lead to increasing efforts for the government and the security apparatus. In order to do so, social workers should also assess their own weakness and limits. A specific formation related to the detection of radicalisation should be provided. Indeed, the rehabilitation and disengagement process are not as easy as it seems. For example, during our field research, we met a man in Surabaya named David, who was sentenced regarding the terrorism activity and then released in 2018. During his prison time, David has committedly cooperated with BNPT and NGOs in the so-called deradicalisation program. He received plenty of promises, including that he would be supported when he released from prison. Labeled as "cooperative" terrorist in-mates, he was released and return to Surabaya. Then, he patiently waited for the promises which have been made by deradicalisation program stakeholders, in order to go back to a normal life.

Sadly, none of the promises made were kept, while at the same time, the radical network he was linked to came back in his life, asking him to join back the fight. Eventually, when BNPT teams visited him in Surabaya, they multiply the promises of support, without delivering any of them. David, disappointed for the second time by the deradicalisation program, decided to join back his former radical network. Police teams in Surabaya, while doing surveillance, noticed that David was back on the radical track. They decided to support him, understanding what have driven him back, and to deliver what stakeholders of deradicalisation program did not do.

This story is not a a lonely case as our field research shows that a majority of terrorist inmates are also facing the same problems of undelivered promises during their participation to the deradicalisation program. The fact that inmates are communicating about this failure tend to show that less and less convicted are willing to participate. Between January and April 2019, only one terrorist inmate from Lapas Kelas IIA of Bengkulu agreed to signed the "Ikrar NKRI" document.

In this perspective, it seems important to take some measures:

First, there is an urgent need to strengthen regulations and to ensure coordination between institutions to define who is responsible and how to handle returnees and “deportees”.

Second, the current deradicalisation program is lacking of sustainability. It should be evaluated in an independent way. To do so, a real evaluation should be done and the stakeholders should agree on best practices and common SOP following high standards.

Third, critics can be fruitful. This evaluation should not only concern institutions but also NGOs involved within this program. The latest should show a real commitment. Indeed, we have to keep in mind that for several NGOs, participation to deradicalisation is project-based, which might participate to the above-mentioned lack of sustainability. In this way, it is essential to commit on a longer term and to deploy only trained and skills social.

3 questions to...Surya Syah

Deputy President of JICT Union (SP JICT)

We asked 3 questions to Mr. Surya Syah, deputy president of the Jakarta International Container Terminal (JICT) union (JICT SP), in order to understand more about JICT operations and the current debate about its management, including operations, which are entrusted to a foreign operator, the Hong Kong based company Hutchinson.

1. Can you tell us more about JICT?

Jakarta International Container Terminal (JICT) is the biggest container terminal in Indonesia. The terminal was firstly privatised in 1999 to a Hong Kong - based-company, Hutchison Port. The contract was granted for 20 years with 51% of Hutchison’s share in the terminal. JICT serves export and import for more than 60 percent in Jakarta and its hinterland, as well as 40% of national cargo movement. So the terminal plays vital role as the economic gateway of Indonesia.

2. How does your union see the government actions towards JITC?

In our opinion, Indonesian government should consider public service sites as sovereign areas, including JICT. If we look at neighboring countries like Malaysia, there is some limits regarding the ownership and operations of port facilities. For example, AP Moeller in Port of Tanjung Pelepas and Hutchison in Westport are both limited by government regulations. It is quite an interesting fact that Hutchison can own 51% of JICT.

We consider that Indonesian government can - and should - implement the same regulations as Malaysia’s, in order to exert its sovereign rights on public services facilities. Beside, the technology of container terminal is not a rocket-science base. With 20 years of terminal-tech-transfer, it is not relevant anymore to argue that we need foreign ownership. Indeed, the knowledge and technologies transferred are more than sufficient, and JICT can be self operated nowadays. In addition, JICT is operated as end destination port, not a transshipment terminal. So the market has mostly been established since 1999.

3. Do you think that Hutchinson operating JITC is a potential threat to Indonesian sovereignty? If yes, what can be done to protect Indonesia’s sovereignty?

Indonesia’s government should continue to encourage foreign investment in our country. But it should be conducted in good intention and in manner ways. If we have a look at Hutchison case in JICT, the company has been found guilty to broke Indonesia’s law and cost at least USD 306 million in losses for the government according to The Supreme Audit Board of Indonesia (BPK), as stated by 2017 BPK report (which refers to Hutchison 20 years (2019-2039) contract extension case).

However, until now Hutchison is pushing for this unlawful contract to be implemented. In term of union busting, we can notice that Hutchison has lead an intensive campaign for cracking and intimidating the union, which is a symbol of workers’ representative. The worst case was happened in 2015. JICT management had sacked 2 workers in the middle of the night via text message and email. The same case had happened in 97 with Australian wharfies in Bottany port, Sydney.

Instead of treating workers with dignity and justice as key assets, the management has crushed its workers with vulgar ways. Moreover, regarding safety aspect, 4 workers JICT have died within 18 months. This reflects that management has failed to implement international safety standard for our container terminal. Keeping these dramatic facts in mind, it is fair to ask for the government to evaluate the actions of this (Hutchinson) global operator in JICT. Should Indonesia government still want to give chance to Hutchison, they can let them invest in other ports in Indonesia. However, none is mature terminal like JICT, and none would bring as much profit. That is why we do encourage government to nationalize JICT.

Indonesian Returnees are now a clear and present danger

On January 27th 2019, a bomb explodes in Jolo’s Our Lady of Mount Carmel Cathedral, located in Sulu area in the Philippines. The day after the attack, which killed 22 and injured more than one hundred people, Philippines Ministry of Defence announced that it was carried out by an Indonesian couple. Since this day, some doubts have been raised on the origins of the suicide bombers. However, Indonesian National Police confirmed recently that both individuals were Indonesian nationals. Nevertheless, for Jolo population, it was clear that this act was the responsibility of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF).

Sulu islands region is the cradle of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), a Filipino terrorist organization founded by a charismatic leader, Abdurrajak Janjalani. Janjalani received a scholarship from Gaddafi government and studied Arabic and theology in Libya in the 1980’s. Adburajjak and his brother – Khaddafy Janjalani– are Afghan jihad veterans. However, some of our interviews in Southern Philippines tends to challenge the importance of this experience. Over the years, Abu Sayyaf Group factions – like Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) before and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF, a splinter cell of MILF) nowadays – have hosted Indonesian terrorists. From Umar Patek to Harry Kuncoro, or from Suryadi Mas’oed to Parawijayanto, several Indonesian terrorists have been sheltered and trained in Southern Philippines, while struggling with their Moro counterpart against Manila government.

As a matter of fact, what can be called the “Indo-Moro” connection exist since 1977, when the MILF splintered from the Moro National liberation Front (MNLF). It is important to keep in mind that Indo-Moro relationship was deeper than merely terror movement. Indeed, MNLF and MILF political agenda was to free Bangsamoro, and not related to current Jihad movement. Siti, an Indonesian national and the widow of a former Indonesian MILF sub-commander, explained that in the 1990’s, MILF start to recruit in several Islamic universities in Indonesia, like UIN Tangerang, where she was studying. Siti supported the struggle of her husband and other Mujahidin against Manila, and moved to Southern Philippines.

Their objective was the establishment of an Islamic government in Southern Philippines. Our interview with Kagi Karialan, the leader of a Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) - faction, confirm that this connection is long-lasting. According to him, there was around 300 Indonesians and Malaysians who fought against Manila government, under the leadership of Hashim Salamat, the deceased leader of MILF.

This special relationship between Indonesians and Moros militants continue nowadays, and more particularly with Abu Sayyaf Group faction under the leadership of Hatib Sawadjan. Sawadjan, does not, according to our interviews with local Ulamas, have any religious education but get his legitimacy from his appointment by ISIS when Isnilon Hapilon, the previous leader, was killed during Marawi siege. His faction is considered as the most attractive for FTF, as it has pledged allegiance to Islamic State. Most of these foreign terrorists, including Indonesians, are hosted by Sawadjan faction in Patikul camp, in Sulu area.

The investigation by Philippines authorities and Indonesian National Police shows that Sawadjan faction played an important role in January 27th bombing. It is nowadays possible to recount the journey of this couple. Rullie Rian Zeke and Ulfah Handayani Saleh were an Indonesian couple living in Makassar. Rullie, the husband, was a member of FPI Makassar chapter before the couple decided to join ISIS in Syria. However, while arriving in Turkey in 2017, the family was arrested by local authorities and deported back to Indonesia. As for every returnee, they were held in a rehabilitation center under the supervision of Ministry of Social Affairs. The family managed to pass the rehabilitation assessment and returned to their hometown, where they went back to their normal activities, while keeping in mind their desire of hijra and jihad. While back in Makassar, the couple met with Andi Baso, a JAD operative who propose them to pursue their radical agenda in Southern Philippines. Andi Baso then coordinate with both his network in Sabah and with ASG Sawadjan faction in Sulu, in order to smuggle the couple from Makassar to Nunukan, then from Nunukan to Semporna, in Sabah, Malaysia, and then from Semporna to Sulu. Densus 88 discovered the role play by Andi Baso after the arrest and interrogation of the Sabah cell smugglers, who stated that their Indonesian contact was a JAD Kalimantan cell operator.

As we seen, several important patterns are emerging from this case. First, the suicide bombers couple have been deported as they were looking to join ISIS in Syria and Iraq. They are returnees. Management of the returnees is a growing concern as, in this this case and in many others, the rehabilitation program setup by Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs have shown its weakness. Moreover, it is established that the monitoring of these returnees has shown some limits. As a matter of fact, since 2015, the FTF special task force of Densus 88 has been handling thousands of returnees without specific regulation or tools to avoid them to fall back in their radical activities. Indeed, some of these returnees continue their radical preaching and activities, as some like Rullie and Ulfa, might still want to accomplish terrorist act.

Second, the pattern followed by Rullie and Ulfa confirm that the regional dimension of terrorism has not stopped after the end of Marawi siege. Cross border terrorist operations are enduring, and it should urge governments to review their cooperation in order to tackle down this threat at regional level. It is important to note that a group like JAD has expand the decentralization of its leadership and decision making, leading to increasing connections with Southern Philippines radical groups. Our field research also shows that the current connection with ASG Sawadjan faction led an increasing number of FTF to join Southern Philippines battlefield. These FTF and their Moro counterparts shows how far they can go in violence during the siege of Marawi. It might have failed, but FTF have learned a lot about regional governments during this battle. where a second Marawi, be it located in Philippines or neighboring countries, is still possible.